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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

19 November 1982

Barbara Ennis
Director, Policy Development
and Coordination Staff
Classification/Declassification
Center (A/CDC)
Bureau of Administration
Department of State

NSC review completed


Dear Ms. Ennis:

Your memorandum of 4 November 1982, forwarded two documents from the John Foster Dulles collection of papers at the Eisenhower Library for our review for declassification. This is in reference to the Microform Project Eisenhower Library (BAF).

We have completed the review and have determined that CIA has no objection to the declassification of the two documents. Your copies of the documents are returned herewith as requested.

Sincerely

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Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

OSD review(s)
completed.

Enclosures:

1. 05/22/54 - Conference with the President
2. 11/24/54 - Memorandum of Conference with the President
State Dept. review
completed

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Present: [redacted] Radford, and Cutler

The first question that came up was the position of the US relative to communist attacks on the island chains bordering the China Coast between Formosa and the mainland. The position of the US as publicly stated up to the present time has related to the defense of Formosa, and there has not been any specific reference to the outlying island chains. However, it is obviously implicit in the defense of Formosa to hold some of the outlying islands. To that end, the US has for some time been flying air patrols, particularly with reference to the islands in the various chains which are held by the Chinats, and where there is some US personnel or radar installation. These visits are entirely proper, as the US has formally recognized Formosa and has publicly announced its position in regard thereto.

Intelligence estimates make clear that the Chinese Communists are massing considerable air and naval forces in East China, including US LST's (which fell into their hands when the Chinats abandoned the mainland). It is estimated that it would take 25,000 ground troops to seize the Tachen group. If such an attack were made by Red China, the Tachens could not be held by the Chinat forces without US air power for the purpose of destroying attacking amphibious craft and supporting Red Chinese aircraft.

The US has as yet no mutual security pact with Formosa. One reason for this is that the US has not wished publicly to make any declaration about the outlying island chains. (The Pescadores group has been dealt with differently, and as a part of Formosa.) The President seriously questioned any public statement as to the US attempting to try to hold any part of the outlying island chains, as too big a commitment of US prestige and forces. It was agreed that no such public statement should be made. Radford pointed out that some of the islands, like Matsu, off Amoy, can be defended by the Chinats from Formosa. He pointed out that the problem facing the US was rather a psychological one at this juncture. He would not wish the Reds to have any more victories on the Far East.

The President also noted that elements of the US Seventh Fleet, such as destroyers or light carriers and possibly a cruiser, visit the Tachens and other islands held by the Chinats, make calls on these islands

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Document No. _____
Review of this document by CIA has determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass

☐ It contains information of CIA

interest that must remain classified at TS S

Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

Date 15 NOV 1982 Reviewer [redacted]

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and perhaps stay for a few days. This show of US strength would make our position clear.


The question was then raised as to what would happen if our Fleet was attacked by the Reds. Sadford pointed out that it might not be necessary to report such an attack. He said that our air patrols were quite frequently attacked, although they kept beyond the 20 mile limit, yet neither side had reported these events. He said that the Navy, if attacked, would of course defend itself.

The President made the point that the US was acting perfectly within its rights in having its armed forces visit territory occupied by a friendly power; that the US had publicly announced its position that it would defend Formosa; that it was merely routine to such defense (whether or not a public announcement had already been made) to defend also outlying islands, the loss of which would make the defense of Formosa much more difficult, or perhaps impossible. Some of these islands, with their radar stations and air fields, are really an integral part of the Formosa defense. He went on to say that we should not offensively attack the mainland of China in defending Formosa and the outlying islands, unless the security of our forces should require such an attack.

(As this matter seemed somewhat obscure to RC, we had a meeting outside the President's office later. The understanding arrived at in this matter was as follows:

If our Fleet on a patrolling mission, such as has been described, or if engaged in defending outlying islands against attack, was drawn into conflict with the Chinese enemy attacking the islands, our planes would not be justified in striking at targets on the Chinese Mainland. If, however, the Chinese Reds made an attack from the mainland on our carrier fleet, perhaps 100 or more miles at sea, then our security would permit us to follow such an attack in hot pursuit to the mainland bases.)

The President asked me to give him a memorandum to speak to the Leaders on Monday, May 24, on this matter. He wants to speak of this in a casual way, as a recital of a continuance of action that we have been taking for some time, - the only new policy question is raised, that we are only continuing to take steps to protect Formosa and the necessary integral territories outlying Formosa. The Seventh Fleet would be continuing the mission which it has held to date. Of course, if the US Fleet, going where it has a right to go, is attacked by an enemy, it could defend itself. Sadford pointed out that the Congress had readily approved of the defense of Formosa, and had appropriated money specifically for that purpose. The Secretary of State will mention to the Republican group when he speaks on the afternoon of May 24 about this matter, making clear that no new question of policy is raised, and that he is merely bringing them up to date on developments in a continuing situation. The President also asked Secretary Anderson casually to mention the matter the next time he testifies before the Armed Services Committee.

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The Secretary of State raised the question of what should be done to prevent further shipments of war munitions from the Soviets to Guatemala. He pointed out that a Swedish ship had already landed two thousand tons of munitions in Guatemala. (The US erroneously ~~ceased~~ *task* to go to Puerto Rico and unload a decoy ship, and missed the munitions carrier). The Secretary thought that we should act promptly, in order to avoid the importation of such a great amount of arms that a major military effort would be required by the US to handle the developing situation. The basic request made by State was that the Navy be authorized to halt suspicious vessels on the high seas off the Guatemalan coast, voluntarily if possible, but by force, if necessary, and if such vessels refused permission to inspect their cargoes, to take them to Panama for inspection; the US being prepared to pay any damage or ~~consequence~~.

In answer to the President's inquiry as to the effect of this action on our friends, and on the other American Republics, the Secretary made these points:

- (1) Honduras and Nicaragua have already asked the US for help. El Salvador probably will ask. Costa Rica is beginning to worry a little about being so close to the Communists.
- (2) Article 51 of the UN Charter provides the right to members of collective and individual defense. What is going on in Guatemala, since the Russians never furnish arms to a country without a bad motive, is a direct threat to the security of the US (via Panama Canal).
- (3) Machinery has been set in motion to call a meeting of the Organization of American States, but this will take a couple of weeks.
- (4) The Caracas Resolution recognizes that the control of an American State by Communists was a threat to the security of the US (17 votes for, 1 vote against, 2 abstentions).
- (5) Assistant Secretary Holland would go to Mexico City to keep the Mexican Government advised.

Under these circumstances, the President agreed to the proposed action, suggesting only that we should give notification to friendly countries of what we are proposing to do.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM:

NOV - 4 1982

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TO:

[Redacted]
Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM:

Barbara Ennis *B*
Director, Policy Development
and Coordination Staff
Classification/Declassification
Center (A/CDC)
Bureau of Administration

SUBJECT: Request for Concurrence in Release

The attached documents appear to be of interest to your agency. They are included in the John Foster Dulles collection of papers at the Eisenhower Library and are part of the material which the Historical Office of the Department of State wishes to publish as a microform supplement to Foreign Relations of the United States.

Both of these documents are being referred also to the National Security Council and the Department of Defense for their concurrence.

The Department of State has no objection to the declassification and release of these documents.

Please inform us whether or not you have any objection to release of these documents. If you believe any of the material should be withheld, please specify. In your reply, please refer to "Microform Project - Eisenhower Library (RAF)". *We would appreciate the return of the documents.*

Attachments:

1. 05/22/54 - Conference with the President
2. 11/24/54 - Memorandum of Conference with the President.

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